Dincecco and Wang 2018, ‘Violent Conflict and Political Development Over the Long Run: China versus Europe’

Notes

You don’t need to read the Model Appendix section on pages 353–355, but the math is not too hard and it might help you understand the theory.

Questions

Comparing Europe to China, what are the key differences in (a) political organization and (b) the nature of warfare that Dincecco and Wang identify?

Dincecco and Wang bring up the argument that economic growth, not warfare, is what spurs the development of political representation. They acknowledge that economic factors might explain differences in development within Europe, but reject the idea that they explain the differences between Europe and China. Why?

What are the basic distinctions between “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” as elite responses to the ruler’s demand for taxes? Why does this model predict that representation is particularly likely to emerge under conditions of political fragmentation?

How did Europe differ from China in terms of the exit options available to elites?

What differences do Dincecco and Wang find in the extractive capacity of European states versus China?

What were the effects of warfare on political development in China, according to Dincecco and Wang? How did these differ from their effects in Europe?

What do Dincecco and Wang conclude about the applicability of the warfare–political development relationship in other areas besides Europe and China?