Chen 2023, ‘State Formation and Bureaucratization: Evidence from Pre-Imperial China’

Notes

As always: no need to understand the mathematical equations, just make sure you understand the plain-language version of the theoretical argument and the evidence behind it.

Questions

How do “fief” and “county” arrangements differ in terms of the principal-agent relationship between the central ruler (principal) and the local authority (agent)?

Why does Chen predict that rulers are more likely to offer “fief” contracts when there is a need for defense against an external threat, compared to when the state plans to launch an offensive war?

Why does Chen predict that local authorities will be more militarily aggressive under the “county” arrangement than under the “fief” arrangement?

Why does Chen see pre-imperial China as a useful case to study to evaluate her theoretical argument?

From the standpoint of the agent, what’s the difference between an offensive war and a defensive war? i.e., what are the potential gains and losses from each type of war, and how do they differ? Furthermore, how do these gains and losses differ depending on whether the ruler has chosen a “fief” or “county” system?

In her statistical analysis, how does Chen measure external threat strength? What does she find about the relationship between external threat strength and the extent of decentralization?

How does Chen measure the aggressiveness of a district’s military strategy? What does she find about the relationship between county-vs-fief organization and aggressiveness?

What alternative explanations for these patterns does Chen consider, and why does she ultimately rule them out?